US Congress - Dirigible disasters (1933) (digital)
US Congress - Dirigible disasters (1933)
This document is the report of the Joint Committee of the US Congress appointed to investigate airship disasters, established by Concurrent Resolution H.Con.Res. 15 of 13 April 1933 following the loss of the naval airship U.S.S. Akron, and presented to the Senate by Mr Walsh on 14 June 1933. On 3 April 1933 at 19:28, the Akron departed its base at Lakehurst (New Jersey) on a training mission to calibrate radio stations in Newport (Rhode Island). Although fog was setting in and the ceiling was only 300 feet at take-off, the officers deemed the weather conditions acceptable; however, the Weather Bureau’s chief forecaster, Charles L. Mitchell, later noted that the 8.00 am weather chart had indicated dangerous disturbances approaching from the south-west. The airship flew towards Philadelphia and then followed the Delaware River, whilst lightning was observed to the south and a thunderstorm was reported over Washington. Captain McCord decided to stay at sea, and the airship, surrounded by lightning, changed course several times. At around 0.30 am on 4 April, violent turbulence caused a rapid descent from 1,600 to 700 feet; after regaining control and briefly stabilising, a second downdraft sent the airship hurtling towards the sea. The stern struck the water approximately 20 miles from Barnegat Lighthouse, tearing off the lower centreboard and rudder, after which the control cables snapped.
Of the 77 crew members, there were only three survivors, including First Officer H. V. Wiley, who was picked up by the steamer Phoebus. The report examines the causes: neither lightning, nor the rupture of gas cells, nor a structural fault or sabotage is established; the immediate cause is a vertical downdraft in a storm zone, with responsibility lying with the ship’s navigation into the storm. The committee noted that the lifejackets, required by regulations, were not on board but in the base store, which constituted a breach of discipline and called into question the findings of the naval court of inquiry. Radio communications were deemed satisfactory, but static interference disrupted the reception of the 8.00 pm weather map.
Following a review of previous disasters (Roma, R-38, Shenandoah, R-101) and the total cost of approximately 40 million dollars incurred over ten years, the report recommends that the Navy continue the development and operation of rigid airships, given their usefulness as long-range reconnaissance craft, the commissioning of the Macon, the recommissioning of the Los Angeles as a training vessel, the construction of a training airship and a craft to replace the Akron, the publication of four daily weather charts, the improvement of altimeters, the development of diesel engines, better training in aerology, and compliance with safety regulations. Additional views, signed by eight members, including Walsh, emphasise the lack of experience among the commanding officers, which contributed significantly to the disaster.
Publisher: United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1934. Number of pages: 19. PDF available for download.